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11 Introduction
Standard microeconomic theory assumes that a household acts as if it were a
single decision maker. Within this tradition, household demand is assumed to
result from maximizing a unique utility function subject to a household budget
constraint. However, a growing body of evidence suggests that this standard
unitary model is at odds with observed household behaviour; the associated
restrictions of homogeneity, symmetry and negativity have been rejected at
numerous occasions (e.g., Blundell, 1988).
A more recent alternative, the so-called collective approach to household
behaviour (Chiappori, 1988, 1992), explicitly takes account of the fact that
multi-person households consist of several individuals with their own rational
preferences; household decisions are then the Pareto eﬃcient outcomes of a bar-
gaining process. This collective approach entails other behavioural restrictions
than the unitary model. Interestingly enough, these restrictions seem to better
ﬁt the data than the ‘traditional’ unitary restrictions; e.g., Browning et alii
(1994), Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiap-
pori et alii (2002).
Still, the hitherto employed tests of the unitary and collective models are
parametric in nature. Hence, they crucially depend on the functional form that
is used for representing the preferences and/or the intrahousehold bargaining
process. They do not only test the unitary or collective approach as such, but
also an ad hoc functional speciﬁcation; rejecting the unitary restrictions may
well be due to ill-speciﬁcation.
Nonparametric tests for consistency of observed behaviour with utility max-
imization or Pareto eﬃciency do not require any assumptions regarding the
parametric form of utility functions or the intrahousehold bargaining process;
see, e.g., Afriat (1967), Varian (1982), Chiappori (1988) and Snyder (2000).
These tests are directly based on revealed preference theory, which makes them
particularly attractive for testing consistency of the data with theoretical be-
havioural models.
This suggests using nonparametric testing tools for comparing the empirical
performance of the unitary and collective model for household behaviour; the
validity of the ﬁndings would no longer be ‘obscured’ by non-veriﬁable paramet-
ric assumptions. However, to the best of our knowledge -and in fact somewhat
surprisingly-, an in-depth nonparametric comparison has not yet been carried
out. This paper wants to ﬁll that gap in the existing literature, by studying
the speciﬁc case of household labour supply behaviour. Conveniently, our fo-
cus on labour supply also guarantees substantial price/wage variation across
individuals, which can only beneﬁt the empirical comparison.
Our following assessment speciﬁcally concentrates on two types of empirical
performance measures:
- First, we compute nonparametric goodness-of-ﬁt measures associated with
each behavioural model. Varian (1990, 1993; based on Afriat, 1972; see also
Cox, 1997) has developed such nonparametric measures for ‘the degree to which
empirical behaviour is consistent with theoretical behaviour’. (These goodness-
2of-ﬁt measures also account for possible reporting errors in the data, which
is an important practical consideration in empirical applications.) Goodness-
of-ﬁt measures correct for the ‘sharp’ nature of standard nonparametric tests,
which only tell us whether or not a given dataset is exactly consistent with
the behavioural model subject to testing. In our opinion, these measures are
directly applicable for assessing and comparing the empirical performance of
theoretical behavioural models.
- Second, we calculate measures for the power of the consistency tests for each
model, i.e. the probability of detecting the alternative hypothesis (e.g., based on
Becker’s (1962) notion of irrational behaviour); Bronars (1987; also Cox, 1997)
ﬁrst proposed nonparametric power measures. We believe that a full (and fair)
comparison of the two behavioural models under study should complement the
above goodness-of-ﬁt analysis with a power analysis. (A similar point was, e.g.,
raised by Snyder (2000).) This is all the more a valid concern since a frequently
cited weakness of nonparametric tools is that they have low power.1 Ac a r e f u l
power assessment allows us to counter that criticism. (In fact, this so-called
lack of power may at least partly explain why nonparametric consistency tests
are so rarely employed in practice, despite their attractive feature of imposing
minimal structure.)
Our empirical evaluation uses a cross-section dataset of Belgian households
(consisting of working individuals), which we divide in three subsamples: female
singles, male singles and couples. We essentially discuss two types of compar-
isons:
- First, we compare the empirical performance of the unitary model for singles
with that for couples. The rationale of this comparison is that the standard
unitary approach should always be fully applicable to singles, even if it does
not well ﬁt the observed behaviour of couples; for singles the behavioural impli-
cations of the unitary model coincide with those of the collective model. This
ﬁrst comparison should give us a deeper understanding of the harmless/harmful
nature of the aggregation assumptions that underlie the unitary modelling of
couples’ behaviour.
- Second, we compare the empirical results of the collective model with those of
the unitary model, both applied to the data of couples. Because the collective
and unitary models evidently have diﬀerent implications for couples’ behaviour,
these results should give us better insight into which of the models does the
better job in explaining the data.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂyr e v i e w st h e
nonparametric methodology for testing the unitary and the collective labour
supply models. In addition, we introduce the nonparametric goodness-of-ﬁt
and power measures. Section 3 presents the results of our application to Belgian
household data. Section 4 concludes.
1Blundell et alii (2001) propose methodological extensions that can considerably improve
the power of the nonparametric tests. Their proposal crucially builds on groups of diﬀerent
households facing the same relative prices. However, a typical feature of our (labour supply)
setting is precisely that prices/wages substantially vary over households, which makes the
Blundell et alii approach not directly applicable in the current context.
32 Methodology
2.1 Testing the unitary model
For the sake of compactness, we only discuss unitary consistency tests for couples
with two working individuals (A and B). Our discussion is directly translated
to the singles’ case.
The nonparametric approach starts from n observations for household con-
sumption and the household members’ labour supply. For each household i
(i =1 ,...,n) we denote the net wage rate and leisure amount of individual I
(I = A,B)b ywI
i and lI
i, respectively. (The leisure amount is computed from
observed labour supply `I
i = T − lI
i,w i t hT the individuals’ time endowment.)
Next, we use yi and ci to respectively denote household i’s (total) nonlabour in-












Within the unitary model, the household decision problem boils down to













without losing generality, we set the price of consumption to 1. A necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the data to be consistent with this utility maximization
problem is that there exists a utility function that rationalizes the household
data, i.e.:


















i ≥ c + wA
i lA + wB
i lB.
Varian (1982) has demonstrated that there exists such a data rationalizing
utility function if and only if the observed set S is consistent with the gener-
alized axiom of revealed preference (GARP). To formally state this last consis-
tency condition, we ﬁrst need the following revealed preference deﬁnition (using ¡
1,wA,w B¢0 = w and
¡
c,lA,l B¢0 = l):







ml for some sequence of
observations (li,lj,...,lm).
We can now deﬁne the GARP condition as:




To facilitate our further exposition, we rephrase this deﬁnition as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 The observed set S satisﬁes GARP if for all j ∈ {1,...,n} :
w0
jlj =m i n
l∈RPj
w0
jl for RPj = {li : liRlj;i ∈ {1,...,n}}.
4This last version directly expresses the idea that observation j ∈ {1,...,n}
is (theoretically) utility maximizing under its budget constraint if and only if it
is expenditure minimizing over its ‘better than’ set; in the (empirical) GARP
condition this last set is approximated by the ‘revealed preferred’ set RPj.
Consistency of S with GARP (and thus with a rationalizing utility function)
is easily tested: we ﬁrst identify the set RPj and consequently check the expen-
diture minimization condition. See, e.g., Varian (1982; p. 949) for an eﬃcient
algorithm.
2.2 Testing the collective model
The collective approach essentially diﬀers from the unitary approach in that each
household member is characterized by own rational preferences, with household
decisions resulting from a Pareto eﬃcient bargaining process (Chiappori, 1988,
1992). Although the individuals’ preferences can be very general, we restrict
attention to egoistic preferences in our discussion; preferences only depend on
own (private) consumption and leisure.2 Empirically, the modelling of this
collective approach is somewhat more involved as the private consumption of
each household member is usually not observed; labour supply datasets only
reveal information on total household consumption.
To see how the empirical analysis of household behaviour proceeds (even
under limited information), we ﬁrst introduce some additional notation. We
denote individual I’s private consumption by cI









¢0 by respectively wI
i and lI
i (I = A,B).
Now consider the case where a (two-person) household is characterized by

















which determines the distribution of the household’s
nonlabour income yi over the household members.3 This sharing rule is formally
deﬁned as follows (see, e.g., Chiappori, 1988, 1992).

















¢0 such that yA
i + yB
i = yi.
The sharing rule concept allows us to model household behaviour as a two-
stage budgeting process. After dividing total nonlabour income in the ﬁrst stage,
each individual I (I = A,B) faces a maximization problem that is formally
















Chiappori (1992) demonstrated that the resulting household allocation is always
Pareto eﬃcient (and that each Pareto eﬃcient allocation can be represented by
such a two-stage budgeting process).
2The analysis is in fact also applicable to individual caring preferences,w h i c hc a nb e





(I = A,B); see
Chiappori (1992) for a detailed discussion.
3Evidently, collective and unitary models are the same for one-person households.
5It turns out that this alternative interpretation of Pareto eﬃcient household
behaviour is particularly convenient within the nonparametric context, as it
entails the same kind of GARP tests as for the unitary model. Indeed, if we
knew private consumption for each observation (cA
i and cB
i ), then we could
immediately check consistency of the observed set S by using the standard
GARP tests at the level of the household members. In practice, however, we
do not observe the intrahousehold allocation of total consumption, and, hence,
we obtain the following condition for the collective model (see also Chiappori,
1988):
Deﬁnition 6 The observed set S is consistent with collective rationalization





¢0 such that for













i ≤ yi + wA
i T + wB
i T
and
GARP is satisﬁed at the individual level (I = A,B):







This condition constitutes the natural counterpart of the unitary GARP test.
Indeed, given that the intrahousehold consumption allocation is not observed,
we only need that there exists at least one feasible allocation entailing individual







i),i=1 ,...,n} that are consistent
with GARP for both individuals.
The above exposition makes clear that we can directly apply the same GARP
test as in the unitary model for each household member, conditional upon the
sharing rule. Importantly, as shown by Chiappori (1988), the resulting collective
test is not nested in the unitary test discussed above; consistency with the uni-
tary GARP condition does not necessarily imply consistency with the collective
GARP condition, and vice versa.4
Snyder (2000) introduced an ‘all-or-nothing’ nonparametric test for the col-
lective model.5 In that test, either data satisfy collective rationality or they
do not. We follow a diﬀerent approach, induced by our speciﬁcf o c u so nt h e
goodness-of-ﬁt of the alternative behavioural models (see further; Section 2.3).
Our starting point is that the collective rationalization test boils down to stan-




4Note that Chiappori (1988) derived his results for a stronger consistency axiom than
GARP, which he calls ‘Strong SARP’ (see also Chiappori and Rochet, 1987). Following Varian
(1982), we start from the more general concept GARP, which suﬃces for most purposes of
empirical nonparametric analysis. In addition, it is easy to show that our goodness-of-ﬁt
and power analysis in the next section remains unaﬀected when starting from Strong SARP
instead of GARP.
5In her analysis, Snyder restricts attention to the case n=2, while we consider the more
general case; e.g., in our application n=281 (see Section 3.1).
6We propose a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, we test GARP for
alternative ‘uniform’ allocation rules, i.e., rules that are simultaneously applied
to all households in the sample. We then select the allocation rule with the
highest number of individual (male and female) household members passing the



















ci for household member B. The best rule in terms of the aforementioned








In the second step, we account for the possibility that diﬀerent households
may be characterized by other allocation rules, which (moderately) deviate from








we randomly draw 2000 combinations of n consumption shares from a normal
distribution with a cumulative probability of 95% for the values between 45%







=0 .95.6 Like in the ﬁrst step, we retain the
combination of shares that is associated with the highest number of individual
household members passing GARP; this combination is used for comparing the
empirical performance of the collective model with that of the unitary model.
As a ﬁnal note, we point out that this approach does not guarantee the
generally most favourable treatment of the collective model: to ensure compu-
tational tractability, our procedure restricts attention to a limited number of
possible combinations of intrahousehold allocations; there may well exist other,
non-investigated combinations that are associated with an even higher num-
ber of individuals consistent with GARP.7 We can therefore conclude that our
empirical (goodness-of-ﬁt and power) analysis implicitly gives the ‘beneﬁto f
the doubt’ to the standard unitary model and, in that sense, we can call it
‘conservative’.
2.3 Empirical performance: goodness-of-ﬁt
The consistency tests reviewed above are ‘sharp’ tests; they only tell us whether
observations are exactly optimizing in terms of the behavioural model that is
under evaluation. However, as argued by Varian (1990), exact optimization
is not a very interesting hypothesis. Rather, we want to know whether the
behavioural model under study provides a reasonable way to describe observed
behaviour; for most purposes, ‘nearly optimizing behaviour’ is just as good as
‘optimizing’ behaviour. Varian’s argument is all the more valid in the context
of comparing theoretical behavioural models: we are primarily interested in the




with µ =0 .5a n dσ =0 .0255102. We have also experimented with larger σ values, but the
corresponding results suggest a worse ﬁt of the collective model.
7From that point of view, a ‘better’ procedure may consist of a grid search which explores all
combinations of intrahousehold allocations between, e.g.,
cA
i
ci =0 .1a n d
cA
i
ci =0 .9w i t hi n t e r v a l
0.01. However, this alternative is computationally extremely cumbersome and therefore not
easy to implement in practice; e.g., the example implies checking 81n diﬀerent combinations.
7extent to which one model ‘ﬁts’ the observed data better than the other model.
Therefore, our following assessment will be based on measures of goodness-of-ﬁt
rather than on the mere consistency tests as such.
Our goodness-of-ﬁt measure is the ‘improved violation index’ (or ‘eﬃciency
index’) proposed by Varian (1993; see also Cox, 1997), which indicates the degree
to which the data are ‘optimizing’ (or ‘eﬃcient’) in the sense of the evaluated
behavioural model.8 More speciﬁcally, this index gives for each observation the
minimal perturbation in the associated budget set that will satisfy the optimiza-
tion (or ‘eﬃciency’) condition; i.e., the perturbation that guarantees consistency
of the observed set S with GARP. (Recall from our previous discussion that the
unitary model and the collective model entail formally the same GARP tests,
so that the following discussion directly applies to both approaches.) The focus
on budget shifts links up with Deﬁnition 4, which states that consistency of the
set S with GARP requires all observations to be expenditure minimizing over
their revealed preferred set.
We refer to Varian (1993) and Cox (1997) for in-depth formal discussions of
Varian’s improved violation index, and restrict to a graphical illustration in the
current study. To keep the exposition simple, we only illustrate the individu-
als’ case. Figure 1 contains 2 leisure(l)-consumption(c)o b s e r v a t i o n s ,w h i c hw e
refer to as 1 and 2. The relative prices for the consumption bundles 1 and 2
correspond to the slopes of the respective budget hyperplanes C1 and C2. Obvi-
ously, both observations imply a violation of GARP: for observation 1, the ratio
between minimal expenditure (over the revealed preferred set, which includes
both 1 and 2) and actual expenditure equals 01’/01, i.e. the (relative) radial
distance between the budget hyperplanes C1’ and C1; similarly, observation 2
violates GARP by the fraction 02’/02, i.e. the radial distance between C2’ and
C2.
The basic concept in Varian’s procedure is the ‘violation index’. For each
observation, this index captures the degree to which actual expenditure exceeds
minimal expenditure, as deﬁned over the revealed preferred set. It varies be-
tween 0 and 1 by construction; a value of 1 suggests behaviour that is consistent
with the optimization hypothesis under study. In our example, the proportions
01’/01 and 02’/02 are the violation index values associated with respectively
observation 1 and observation 2.
In the Varian (1993) terminology, both observations in Figure 1 are involved
in a ‘revealed preference cycle’. Varian then proposes a procedure that identiﬁes
the minimal expenditure perturbations needed to ‘break’ this cycle. The central
idea behind the procedure is that a cycle can often be eliminated by perturbing
just one of the budget hyperplanes involved in the cycle; it is not necessary to
shift the budget hyperplanes of all consumption bundles. Speciﬁcally, Varian’s
procedure starts from the basic violation index to construct an improved vio-
lation index for each observation. This improved index captures the minimal
budget hyperplane perturbations associated with the respective consumption
8Cox (1997) shows that Varian’s improved violation index can also be interpreted as cor-
recting the sharp test procedure for over- or underreporting in the expenditure data.
8bundles to obtain consistency with GARP.
In our graphical example, it suﬃces to shift the budget hyperplane C1 by
a (positive) factor that is strictly below the associated violation index (e.g.,
e*(01’/01)<(01’/01), with e close to unity). A test for optimizing behaviour
that is weaker than the orginal ‘sharp’ test then multiplies the original expen-
diture level of observation 1 by that factor, while leaving the expenditure level
of observation 2 unaltered. It turns out that we cannot reject GARP for these
newly constructed expenditure values: observation 1 is no longer revealed pre-
ferred to observation 2 (and, hence, observation 2 is consistent with GARP by
construction), and is itself expenditure minimizing over its revealed preferred
set (which includes both 1 and 2). Notice that 01’/01 is closer to unity than
02’/02, so that shifting C1 (by e*(01’/01)) is less ‘drastic’ than shifting C2
(by, e.g., e*(02’/02)). Hence, Varian’s procedure selects e*(01’/01) and 1 (and
not 1 and e*(02’/02)) as the improved violation index values corresponding to
observations 1 and 2, respectively.
Of course, in the general case with multiple observations, more than two
consumption bundles are often involved in a revealed preference cycle. For this
case, Varian proposes an iterative algorithm for computing improved violation












Figure 1: The improved violation index for individuals
2.4 Empirical performance: power
A full empirical assessment should contain more than only a goodness-of-ﬁt
analysis of the alternative models; we believe it important to additionally ac-
count for the power of each model. Indeed, favourable goodness-of-ﬁtr e s u l t s ,
indicating few violations of the behavioural restrictions, have little meaning if
the behavioural implications are hardly restrictive; i.e., optimizing behaviour
can hardly be rejected.
The construction of our nonparametric power measure follows Bronars (1987;
see also Cox, 1997). That is, we use a randomization procedure to construct
the power measure. This procedure is based on Becker’s (1962) notion of irra-
tional behaviour, which states that a consumer chooses consumption bundles
9In this application, we set the factor e (see our above example) equal to 0.9999999999.
9randomly from his budget set. More speciﬁcally, Beckerian irrational behaviour
means that the consumer chooses consumption bundles from a uniform distri-
bution across all bundles in the budget hyperplane. Bronars’ power measure
then captures the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of optimizing (or
‘rational’) behaviour in case of such irrational (or ‘random’) behaviour.10
We quantify power of the GARP test associated with each model as follows.
Firstly, we simulate irrational/random behaviour for each observation in the set
S. That is, for the diﬀerent (leisure and consumption) commodities we draw
random budget shares (of at least 1%, summing to 100%) from a continuous uni-
form distribution. The generated budget shares are then multiplied by observed
total expenditure and divided by the actual price of each commodity, to obtain
the random consumption of each commodity. Subsequently, we check consis-
tency with the GARP condition for each observation, based on the simulated
(‘irrational’) quantity bundles and actual prices. In our empirical application,
we repeat this procedure 1000 times. For each observation, the proportion of
rejections of GARP (over these 1000 replications) gives the probability of de-
tecting irrational behaviour of that observation, given random behaviour of the
other observations.
Hence, for each model that we evaluate we measure power in each element
of the observed set S. This practice contrasts with Bronars (1987) and Cox
(1997), who provide overall power measures that are based on the entire sample.
Their measures reveal the probability that random behaviour of at least one
observation in the sample is detected.
In our opinion, evaluating power at the level of individual observations is
more informative. For example, it provides a much more detailed insight into
the extent to which the diﬀerent observations can cause rejection of the model
under study; we believe that there is a stronger case for a model that has high
power in many observations than for a model with high power in only a few ob-
servations. Also, an observation-speciﬁc power measure naturally links up with
our observation-speciﬁcg o o d n e s s - o f - ﬁt measure; persistently high goodness-of-
ﬁt values for a given sample of observations are all the more convincing evidence
in favour of a particular behavioural model if they are complemented with gen-
erally high power values for the same sample.
3 Application
3.1 Data and methodological issues
Our data are drawn from the 1992 and 1997 waves of the Socio-Economic Panel
(SEP) of the Center for Social Policy (University of Antwerp). Speciﬁcally, we
focus on three subsamples: female singles, male singles and couples. The ﬁrst
two subsamples consist of female and male singles that meet the following cri-
10As discussed by Bronars, that probability directly depends on the number of budget set
intersections associated with the diﬀerent consumption bundles under study; if there are no
intersections, then irrational behaviour cannot be detected.
10teria: no children, aged between 25 and 55 and employed. The third subsample
consists of (de-facto) couples, where the household members meet the same cri-
teria as the selected singles. To minimize the impact of measurement error,
we have trimmed out from each subsample those households that include a (fe-
male/male) member with a wage that lies above the 97.5 percentile or below
the 2.5 percentile of the empirical (female/male) wage distribution. This yields
samples of 123 single females, 173 single males and 281 couples.
Cox (1997) and Snyder (2000) also conduct nonparametric tests of labour
supply behaviour on micro-data (individuals and households). They test con-
sistency with GARP of time-series data and, hence, they exclude preference
variation over time. Our analysis deviates slightly in that we assume constant
preferences in each cross-section subsample (female singles, male singles and
couples); in each subsample, all observations correspond to the same prefer-
ences but to diﬀerent price regimes.
Our motivation for this particular preference homogeneity assumption is
threefold. Firstly, the SEP was subject to substantial attrition between 1992 and
1997: because many new households entered the data set in 1997, only a small
number of households were observed in both waves of the SEP; there are too few
households with two consecutive observations for robust nonparametric testing
based on time-series data. Secondly, our selection criteria ensure relatively
homogeneous subsamples, which makes that our equal preference assumption
does not seem overly strong.11 Finally, and importantly, recall that we focus
on goodness-of-ﬁt measures in our following analysis. Obviously, this practice
anticipates (slight) preference variation over households. As a matter of fact,
we believe that our preference homogeneity assumption, which is indispensable
for a meaningful application, directly calls for a nonparametric goodness-of-ﬁt
analysis rather than a mere examination of the results obtained from the ‘sharp’
consistency tests discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.12
3.2 Singles versus couples
Figure 2 presents the cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f.’s) of the goodness-
of-ﬁt measures (i.e. the improved violation or eﬃciency indexes) associated
with the unitary model for female singles, male singles and couples.13 When
restricting to the ‘sharp’ GARP condition, we would conclude rejection for all
three subsamples; relatively few observations have an index value that equals
100%. Recalling our earlier discussion, however, this result should not be very
surprising given our assumption of equal preferences over all observations in
11Compare, e.g., with Famulari (1995). She analyses consistency of observed behaviour with
GARP (in a unitary framework) for homogenous subgroups of households that are identiﬁed
on the basis of similar selection criteria.
12In this sense, our goodness-of-ﬁt measures have an interpretation that is comparable to
that of the unobserved error terms in parametric regressions, where similar households are
a s s u m e dt oh a v e‘ m o r eo rl e s s ’t h es a m ep r e f e r e n c e s .
13For expositional convenience, the c.d.f.’s have been cut oﬀ at the 91% eﬃciency level since
no observation has a violation index below that ﬁgure. We also explicitly distinguish between
indexes that are equal to 1 and those that are less than 1.
11each subsample. It seems more meaningful to look at the entire distribution of



























































Figure 2: Unitary model singles and couples: cumulative distribution function
of improved violation index
When considering the c.d.f.’s more closely, we observe important diﬀerences
between couples and singles. Firstly, we ﬁnd that 55% of the female singles and
69% of the male singles are fully eﬃcient in terms of the improved violation
index, as opposed to only 17% of the couples. Secondly, and more importantly,
the index values of couples are generally below those of singles; the couples’
distribution is stochastically dominated by the two (female and male) singles’
distributions. One-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests conﬁrm this overall pic-
ture: the null hypothesis of equal distributions of couples on the one hand and
male and female singles on the other hand is rejected (at any conventional sig-
niﬁcance level) in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the couples’ index
systematically lies below the respective singles’ indexes; see Table 1.
A ﬁnal comparison of these goodness-of-ﬁt results is based on Varian (1990).
When introducing the nonparametric goodness-of-ﬁt idea, Varian (p.129) sug-
gests the ‘magic number’ of signiﬁcance tests, 5%, as ‘probably a reasonable
choice’ for evaluating consistency of observed behaviour with the model under
study. This suggests a nonparametric ‘95% (= 100%-5%) test’ for consistency
with the optimization hypothesis. Hence, it seems worthwhile to compare the
number of observations of each subsample that pass this test. Once more, such
comparison reveals that the unitary model ﬁts the singles’ data much better
than the couples’ data: all female singles and 98% of the male singles are at
least 95% eﬃcient, in contrast to only 87% of the couples; see Figure 2.
As discussed before, a comparison that is solely based on goodness-of-ﬁt
can be misleading: goodness-of-ﬁtd i ﬀerences may be caused by power diﬀer-
ences. For the sake of completeness (and fairness), we therefore complement
our goodness-of-ﬁt analysis with a power analysis.
The c.d.f.’s of the individually calculated power indexes for single females,
single males and couples are shown in Figure 3.14 This ﬁgure reveals high power
14In contrast to Figure 2, Figure 3 presents the whole c.d.f. The reason is that a few
12for most observations: 96% of the couples, 92% of the male singles and 89% of
the female singles have a power index value that exceeds 95%; for these obser-
vations, irrational/random behaviour will be detected with a probability of at
least 95%. More generally, while the overall power for couples appears to be
slightly higher than for female and -to a somewhat lesser extent- male singles,
Figure 3 suggests that the diﬀerences remain marginal. This impression is con-
ﬁrmed by one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests: we cannot reject (at the 5%
signiﬁcance level) equality of the c.d.f.’s in favour of the alternative hypothesis
that the power index values for (female and male) singles are lower than those
for couples; see Table 1.
We conclude that the relatively poor performance of the unitary model for
describing observed couples’ behaviour (when compared to singles’ behaviour)
can hardly be attributed solely to higher power of the model for the associated
couples’ consistency tests. In our opinion, these ﬁndings strongly question the
















































































































Figure 3: Unitary model singles and couples: cumulative distribution function
of power
Table 1: Diﬀerences between singles and couples
Imp. viol. index Power index
Single women vs. couples 0.000 0.055
Single men vs. couples 0.000 0.290
Entries show the probability that the null hypothesis of equal distribution is
true, as computed on the basis of a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; we
compare the distributions of the improved violation index and the power index
for couples with the respective distributions for single women and single men.
observations have very low power indexes.
133.3 Unitary versus collective model
Our previous ﬁndings cast doubts on the usefulness of the unitary model for an-
alyzing couples’ behaviour. As a natural next step, we now investigate whether
the collective approach provides a better alternative for modelling couples’ be-
haviour, by comparing its empirical performance with that of the unitary model.
Like before, our unitary results refer to GARP tests at the aggregate household
level. By contrast, our collective results are obtained from applying GARP
tests to the individual members of each couple, hereby using the intrahousehold
allocations obtained by the procedure described in Section 2.
Figure 4 presents the c.d.f.’s of the goodness-of-ﬁt measure for couples (in
the unitary model) and female and male household members (in the collective
model). In line with our earlier results, substantially more individuals than
(aggregate) households behave consistently with the utility maximization hy-
pothesis: 38% of the men and 35% of the women are 100% eﬃcient, while only
17% of the couples attain an improved violation index of 100%. In fact, Figure
4 reveals a picture that is roughly similar to that in Figure 2: the (unitary) cou-
ples’ distribution is stochastically dominated by the (collective) distributions
of the male and female household members. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test re-
sults in Table 2 provide further evidence in support of the collective model: the
null hypothesis of equal c.d.f.’s is strongly rejected in favour of the alternative
hypothesis that the couples’ improved violation index systematically lies below
that for women and men in the collective model. Finally, also the 95% consis-
t e n c yt e s t sf a v o u rt h ec o l l e c t i v em o d e l :f r o mF i g u r e4w eo b s e r v et h a ti nt h e
collective model all women and 99% of the men are at least 95% eﬃcient, while













































Figure 4: Unitary versus collective model couples: cumulative distribution
function of improved violation index
Again, we complement this goodness-of-ﬁt analysis with a power analysis.
Our power results persistently indicate that the better ﬁt of the collective model
is not due to lower power; the hypothesis that there are no power diﬀerences is
even better supported than in the previous section, where we observed slightly
14(although not signiﬁcantly) higher power of the unitary model in the couples’
case than in the singles’ case. For example, Figure 5 clearly shows that the dis-
tribution of the power indexes is practically the same for couples (in the unitary
model) and individuals (in the collective model). This observation is formal-
ized in Table 2: one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveal that equality of the
c.d.f.’s of the power indexes cannot be rejected at any conventional signiﬁcance
level. Moreover, the power indexes are generally high: 96% of the couples (in
the unitary model), 96% of the females and 95% of the males (in the collective
model) have a power index that amounts to at least 95%; see Figure 5.
In our opinion, these results provide strong enough evidence to argue that
the collective approach performs signiﬁcantly better than the unitary approach
in the modelling of couples’ labour supply behaviour. In fact, this argument be-
comes all the more convincing when taking into account our rather rudimentary
procedure to model the intrahousehold allocation; more reﬁned allocation iden-
tiﬁcation procedures (e.g., based on a grid search; cf. supra) can only beneﬁt















































Figure 5: Unitary versus collective model couples: cumulative distribution
function of power
Table 2: Diﬀerences between the unitary model and the collective model
Imp. viol. index Power index
Single women vs. couples 0.000 0.934
Single men vs. couples 0.000 0.991
Entries show the probability that the null hypothesis of equal distribution is
true, as computed on the basis of a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; we
compare the distributions of the improved violation index and the power index
for couples in the unitary model with the respective distributions for women
and men in the collective model.
154 Conclusion
We have compared the empirical performance of the standard unitary approach
to modelling household labour supply behaviour with that of the more recently
developed collective approach. Speciﬁcally, we quantiﬁed empirical performance
in terms of well-deﬁned goodness-of-ﬁtm e a s u r e s ,w h i c ht e l lu st ow h a te x t e n t
the behavioural model explains observed behaviour. Our analysis deviates from
the mainstream literature in that we employ nonparametric tools to quantify the
p e r f o r m a n c eo ft h ed i ﬀerent models; nonparametric analysis avoids the possibly
distortive eﬀects of an ill-speciﬁed functional form for the preferences and/or the
intrahousehold bargaining process. We have complemented our goodness-of-ﬁt
analysis with an in-depth power analysis; power measures allow for evaluat-
ing the extent to which favourable goodness-of-ﬁt results may be due to low
discriminatory power of the associated consistency tests.
Our ﬁndings strongly suggest using the collective model for analyzing the be-
haviour of households consisting of multiple individuals. For example, we found
that the unitary model performs signiﬁcantly worse when applied to couples
than when applied to singles. As these results could not be explained by signiﬁ-
cant power diﬀerences, we conclude that they reﬂect violations of the preference
aggregation assumptions that underlie the unitary approach, i.e., that a house-
hold behaves as a single decision maker. Indirectly, this provides an argument
in favour of the collective model, as the latter explicitly recognizes that multi-
person households consist of several individuals with own (possibly diverging)
preferences.
Direct comparison of the collective model with the unitary model provided
additional evidence to support the use of the collective model: the collective
model ﬁts observed couples’ behaviour much better than the unitary model.
Again, this signiﬁcant diﬀerence cannot be attributed to power diﬀerences.
Hence, our ﬁndings do not only indicate that the unitary approach is too re-
strictive for modelling couples’ behaviour, but also that the collective model
constitutes a more promising alternative.
In a way, our nonparametric analysis reproduces the parametric results of
Browning and Chiappori (1998). By adopting an explicit nonparametric orienta-
tion, we counter the possible criticism on those latter results that they primarily
reﬂect the impact of the (non-veriﬁable) functional form that is employed. In
our opinion, the main strength of our analysis is precisely that it tests the va-
lidity of the diﬀerent behavioural models directly on the observed data. More
generally, we believe that our study illustrates that nonparametric analysis is
particularly useful for evaluating alternative, ‘competing’ behavioural models,
especially since they avoid the ‘black box’ of the functional form.
We see at least two avenues for further research within this nonparametric
orientation. Firstly, a more advanced modelling of the intrahousehold consump-
tion allocation can be pursued. In our opinion, the two-stage procedure used
in the current paper can provide a useful starting point towards a (computa-
tionally tractable) procedure based on goodness-of-ﬁt criteria. A second, closely
related research topic concerns the issue of recovering the sharing rule and the
16individual preferences within a collective model; compare with Varian (1982),
who addresses similar questions within the unitary framework. Indeed, as em-
phasized at various occasions in the existing literature (e.g., Chiappori, 1992),
detailed knowledge of these concepts can be very informative for welfare com-
parisons.
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